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Assessing Financial Vulnerability in the Nonprofit Sector 
 
Abstract 
Effective nonprofit governance relies upon understanding an organization’s financial 
condition and vulnerabilities. However, financial vulnerability of nonprofit organizations is a 
relatively new area of study. In this paper, we compare two models used to forecast bankruptcy in 
the corporate sector (Altman 1968 and Ohlson 1980) with the model used by nonprofit researchers 
(Tuckman and Chang 1991). We find that the Ohlson model has higher explanatory power than 
either Tuckman and Chang’s or Altman’s in predicting four different measures of financial 
vulnerability. However, we show that none of the models, individually or combined, are effective 
in predicting financial distress. We then propose a more comprehensive model of financial 
vulnerability by adding two new variables to represent reliance on commercial-type activities to 
generate revenues and endowment sufficiency. We find that this model outperforms Ohlson’s 
model and performs substantially better in explaining and predicting financial vulnerability. 
Hence, the expanded model can be used as a guide for understanding the drivers of financial 
vulnerability and for identifying more effective proxies for nonprofit sector financial distress for 
use in future research. 
Keywords: financial vulnerability, financial distress, bankruptcy prediction, nonprofit 
JEL descriptors:  L31 (nonprofit institutions); M41 (accounting) 
 
2
1. Introduction 
In the past few years, a series of financial scandals have shaken several large nonprofits, 
including Planet Aid Canada (Cribb 2002), the NAACP, United Way, Upsala College, and the 
Nature Conservancy (Gibelman, Gelman and Pollack 1997, Stephens 2004). These and other high 
profile cases – along with the growing visibility of the sector – have generated calls throughout 
North America for strengthening nonprofit governance (for example, see Boudreau 2003, Strom 
2003). In the US, several states, notably New York, have proposed that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act1 
be applied more broadly to nonprofit organizations, while the US Senate Finance Committee has 
held hearings on proposed legislation that would substantially increase in regulation and alter 
board governance practices (Office of New York State Attorney General 2003, US Senate Finance 
Committee 2004).   
Indeed, an essential governance role is financial oversight and accountability. Board 
members are responsible not only for mitigating fraud but also for ensuring that organizations 
have sufficient financial resources to fulfill its mission in the present and the future. Hence, 
effective nonprofit governance relies upon understanding an organization’s financial condition and 
vulnerabilities. The ability to predict which organizations may become financially vulnerable is 
also important to government regulatory agencies when setting accountability and disclosure 
policies, external accountants when determining the risk inherent in an audit, foundations when 
distributing and monitoring grants, and management during the strategic planning process.  
Our sample period (1998-2000) is of potential interest due to the onset of adverse 
economic conditions. The stock boom ended soon after the turn of the century with the bursting of 
the “dot.com” bubble in 2000, sending technology stocks and the market as a whole downward. 
While economic indicators and the stock market continued to decline in 2000, the economy had 
not yet been impacted by the unforeseen and catastrophic conditions that followed the September 
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11, 2001 terrorist attacks and exacerbated a growing recession. In addition to entity-specific 
factors, the financial health of nonprofit organizations is impacted by economic conditions through 
several mechanisms. First, individual giving is affected by both personal income and employment 
rates, which tend to decline during recessions. Corporate donations also decline when corporate 
profits decline.  Second, stock and bond market declines impact individual, foundation, and 
corporate giving as well as endowment earnings.  In particular, foundation giving declines since 
the required payout ratio is based on lower portfolio values and this reduces funds available for 
distribution. Third, government contracts and grants expand and contract in accordance with 
economic conditions as well as political ramifications of the changing composition of legislatures 
and executive officers and attitudes toward deficit spending at the federal level. Nonprofit 
organizations began to feel the impact of these declines in 2000 as revenues were stretched to meet 
continuing high demand for services. 
Prior research in this area has been constrained by small samples dominated by large 
nonprofit organizations, limited financial data availability, use of less powerful and biased 
regression techniques, and a potentially weak explanatory model. Greenlee and Trussel (2000) 
were the first to develop a prediction model for the nonprofit sector by applying methods that have 
been used extensively in the for-profit sector. Their model, like later efforts (Hager 2001; Trussel 
2002; and Trussel and Greenlee 2004), used accounting ratios initially developed by Tuckman and 
Chang (1991). We look to the for-profit literature for other potentially useful independent 
variables, specifically to Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980). Both of these models have been used 
extensively in the business sector to predict bankruptcy and financial distress. We compare the 
usefulness of the Tuckman and Chang variables to those from Altman and Ohlson using a discrete 
hazard rate model rather than a single period logit model.  
We find that the Ohlson model has higher explanatory power than either Tuckman and 
Chang’s or Altman’s in predicting four different measures of financial vulnerability. However, we 
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show that none of the models are effective in classifying organizations at risk. We then propose a 
more comprehensive model of financial vulnerability. We find that the proposed model 
outperforms Ohlson’s model and does substantially better in explaining and predicting financial 
vulnerability. Hence, the revised model should be used a guide to understanding the drivers of 
financial distress and for identifying more effective proxies for financial vulnerability to be used in 
future research. 
The paper continues as follows: Section II describes the prior literature, contrasting the 
work in the nonprofit field with that in the corporate arena. Section III outlines our research 
methodology, while Section IV discusses our sample selection. In Section V, we present the 
descriptive statistics and regression results. We present an alternative model in Section VI. The 
final section summarizes and concludes the paper. 
2. Prior Literature 
The For-Profit Perspective 
Corporate bankruptcy prediction has been a popular area of research since the late 1960s. 
This area of research has relied primarily on accounting measures such as profitability, cash flow, 
and leverage ratios as predictor variables.  Of the early studies, Altman (1968) became the most 
influential. In that paper, he developed a Z-Score based on five variables that had the highest 
predictive power in a multivariate discriminant analysis model (MDA). The probability of 
bankruptcy increases as the Z-Score decreases, and Altman reports that a cutoff value of 2.675 
minimizes the total Type I and Type II classification errors. The Z-Score is still widely used by 
both academics and practitioners. 
The next generation of default studies, including Santomero and Vinso (1977), Ohlson 
(1980), and Zmijewski (1984), employed multinomial choice techniques, such as maximum-
likelihood logit and probit. Of the multinomial choice-based studies, Ohlson's (1980) one-year 
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prediction model has been widely cited and used. Researchers often rely on an O-Score calculated 
using Ohlson's original coefficients from Model 1 as a proxy for financial distress. The popularity 
of the Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) models is reflected in the frequent use of the two models 
as empirical proxies for bankruptcy risk in accounting research. A recent study by Begley, Ming 
and Watts (1996) compares the predictive accuracy of the two models using both the original 
coefficients and estimates based on more recent data. They find that the magnitudes (and some of 
the signs) of several parameter values have significantly shifted for both models. Hillegeist, 
Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004) find that the Ohlson model using updated coefficients has 
greater predictive power than the original Ohlson and Altman models as well as the Altman model 
with updated coefficients.2  
The Nonprofit Perspective  
Taken as a whole, the nonprofit sector in the United States is equivalent to a major 
industry that employs seven percent of all workers and grosses $665 billion in annual revenues 
(Independent Sector 2002). The million-plus nonprofit organizations engage in a wide range of 
activities ranging from small museums and cemetery organizations to major hospitals and 
universities. These organizations are neither governmental agencies nor businesses operated to 
earn a return for their owners.  They exist to provide a public benefit (normally the purview of 
government) within a private organizational context.  They do not operate to earn a profit, and no 
ownership interest can ever be redeemed, transferred or sold (Salamon 1999). However, nonprofit 
entities are similar to business organizations in that they compete for scarce capital resources 
(whether in the form of loans, donations or government contracts) and lack the coercive taxing 
power of government.  
While bankruptcy prediction has long been a popular research topic in the for-profit 
sector, only a few studies have focused on nonprofits.  There are two primary reasons for this.  
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First, few nonprofits ever declare bankruptcy; to a large extent, they either merge with other 
nonprofits or simply “disappear” (Hager, Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld 1996).3 Thus, using 
“bankruptcy” as the independent variable excludes a substantial group of nonprofits that may be at 
risk financially.  Second, until fairly recently, it was only possible to examine a small number of 
nonprofits, since nonprofit databases were largely unavailable (Gordon, Greenlee and Nitterhouse 
1999).   
In 1991, Tuckman and Chang posited that a nonprofit was financially vulnerable if it 
were “likely to cut back its service offerings immediately when it experiences a financial shock” 
such as the loss of a significant source of funds or a general economic downturn (p. 445). They 
identified four accounting ratios that could be used to indicate financial vulnerability:  few revenue 
sources, insufficient net assets, low administrative costs, and low income from operations.  
Tuckman and Chang then obtained a random sample of 4,730 nonprofit organizations’ 1983 Form 
990 tax returns from the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS), computed the four ratios and divided 
the results into quintiles.  They defined as “severely at risk” any nonprofit with all four ratios in 
the lowest quintile. A nonprofit with only one ratio in the bottom quintile was defined as “at risk”.  
Tuckman and Chang made no attempt to see if these variables could actually be used to predict the 
future financial distress of these organizations. 
Greenlee and Trussel (2000) were the first to use Tuckman and Chang’s ratios to develop 
a model to predict financial distress in the nonprofit sector. Because of the lack of data on 
nonprofit bankruptcies, they defined as “financially vulnerable” any nonprofit organization that 
saw an overall decline in program expenses during a three-year period.  Using the recently 
available Form 990 database provided by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) and 
a methodology initially developed by Altman (1968), they examined data from the 1992–1995 
Form 990s of 6,795 nonprofits. They found a significant relationship between financial distress 
and three of Tuckman and Chang’s variables.   
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Trussel and Greenlee (2004) expanded this study in five ways. First, they included size in 
the model, since smaller organizations may be more vulnerable to financial distress than larger 
ones. Second, they controlled for nonprofit sub-sector, since different types of nonprofits may be 
impacted differently by changes in the economy.  Third, they defined “financial distress” as a 
“significant” decrease in net assets over a three-year period.  Fourth, they tested the resulting 
models for robustness by applying them to different time periods.  Finally, they developed a way 
to rate the financial vulnerability of nonprofits. Their composite model was robust and was, with 
some accuracy, able to predict financial distress.  Significant relationships were found between 
financial distress and two Tuckman and Chang measures and between financial distress and 
organizational size.   
Trussel (2002) used a broader data set to predict financial vulnerability.  The NCCS Core 
Files includes smaller organizations but fewer data fields.  The final sample included 94,002 
charities for the period 1997-1999 and financial distress was defined as a 20 percent reduction in 
net assets over a three-year period.  Two of the Tuckman and Chang variables could not be 
computed since the necessary information was not coded by the Internal Revenue Service (equity 
ratio and administrative cost ratio).  Trussel replaced the equity ratio with a debt ratio (total 
liabilities divided by total assets) and added a size variable.  Due to the expanded data set, 
nonprofit sub-sector control variables were more detailed than possible in previous studies.  All 
the variables were statistically significant, and the predictive ability exceeded that of a naïve 
model. 
Hager (2001) examined the ability of the Tuckman and Chang ratios to predict the actual 
demise of arts organizations.  He found that predictive ability varied within the sector: the 
Tuckman and Chang measures could be used to predict the closure of some, but not all, arts 
organizations. 
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Comparison of the Prediction Models 
The Tuckman and Chang model has been the only one used, so far, to predict financial 
distress in the nonprofit sector. Their model uses four variables: equity ratio (total equity/total 
revenue), revenue concentration index, administrative cost ratio (administrative expenses/total 
revenue), and surplus margin (net income/total revenues).  To measure the revenue concentration, 
we divide the revenue sources into three categories: donations (total contributions and net special 
event revenue), earned income (program service revenue, dues and assessments, profits from sale 
of inventory and other revenue), and investment income (interest, dividends, net rental expenses, 
other investment income, and realized gains/losses on sales of securities or other assets). The three 
revenue sources (identified as i below) are combined as follows: 
RCI     =      
2
Revenue Total
Revenue∑ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ i                                                           (1) 
 The Altman model has been used for over four decades to predict corporate bankruptcy 
and has been the foundation for at least one commercially sold model.  The model relies on five 
variables: working capital-to-total assets (WC/TA), retained earnings-to-total assets (RE/TA), 
earnings before interest and tax-to-total assets (EBIT/TA), market value of equity-to-total 
liabilities (MVE/TL), and sales-to-total assets (S/TA). The variable selection appears relatively 
intuitive, with measures representing liquidity, solvency, profitability, leverage, and asset 
turnover, respectively. In contrast to Tuckman and Chang, the variables in the Altman model are 
scaled by total assets rather than total revenues. To implement the model in the nonprofit setting, 
several adjustments to the model are required. First, the nonprofit equivalent for retained earnings 
is “net assets” but, unlike retained earnings, net assets represent the entirety of the capital 
structure. Similarly, sales are referred to as total revenues. Most importantly, MVE/TL is excluded 
due to the lack of information on the market valuation of the firms. If the book value of equity 
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were used as a surrogate for market value, the resulting variable would be highly correlated with 
the solvency variable.4   
 The Ohlson model is less parsimonious and uses multiple variables for certain factors. 
For liquidity, his model includes working capital-to-total assets (WC/TA) as well as current 
liabilities-to-current assets (CL/CA). Profitability is represented by three variables: net income-to-
total assets (NI/TA); a discrete variable (INTWO) that is one if Net Income was negative for the 
last two years, zero otherwise; and a scaled change in net income (CHIN). Solvency is captured by 
total liabilities-to-total assets (TL/TA) and a discrete variable (NAFail) that is one if net assets are 
negative, zero otherwise.5 Ohlson’s model does not include a measure of asset turnover but does 
include size and cash flow variables. SIZE is the log of total assets scaled by the GDP deflator, 
while FFO/TL is funds from operations divided by total liabilities. To estimate this model, we 
modified several variables. Due to the lack of historical data, INTWO was changed to being one if 
the prior year’s net income was negative. As no cash flow statement is provided in Form 990, we 
estimate funds from operations using income before interest and depreciation, commonly known 
as EBITDA.6  
3. Research Methodology 
Discrete Hazard Rate Regression Model     
As a regression technique, we use a discrete hazard model used by Shumway (2001) and 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) rather than the more common single-period logit approach. Our rationale 
for choosing the discrete hazard model is based on Allison (1984), Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), 
and Shumway (2001). The discrete hazard model estimates the probability of bankruptcy, p, using 
the following function form: 
βα it
it
it Xt
p
p +=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− )(1log                    (2) 
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where α(t) is a time-varying and/or industry-specific variable that captures the underlying baseline 
hazard rate. In contrast to the discrete hazard model, the ordinary logit model has the following 
form: 
βα i
i
i X
p
p +=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−1log                    (3) 
The discrete hazard maximum likelihood estimator differs from ordinary logit in two 
important ways. First, as the time-script t indicates, the hazard rate model includes multiple 
observations for the same firm, i. In logit models, researchers generally select the year prior to 
bankruptcy for bankrupt firms, and just one observation for non-bankrupt firms. This process 
introduces a sample selection bias. Relying on a single observation per firm neglects most firm-
years during which the firm was at risk of bankruptcy but remained solvent. Shumway (2001) 
demonstrates that this sample selection procedure generates biased and inconsistent coefficient 
estimates.  
Second, the logit models may be misspecified by not including variables that capture the 
systematic changes in the underlying or baseline risk of bankruptcy, α(t). By including a baseline 
hazard rate, the discrete hazard model addresses the issue of dependence arising from a fluctuating 
systematic hazard rate. For example, the underlying bankruptcy risk may be higher in a certain 
industry or during an economic recession. Optimally, this is done by including the system-level 
variables, such as macro-economic factors, that cause the temporal or industry-specific 
dependence in the data. We model the baseline hazard in the nonprofit sector by using both 
industry and time dummies.7  
The discrete hazard rate model can suffer from a problem of dependence due to the 
inclusion of multiple observations from the same firm. This intertemporal firm dependence can 
result in understated standard errors. Similar to Hillegeist et al. (2004), we use Huber-White 
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standard errors to address this problem (Huber 1967, White 1980). The Huber-White correction is 
conservative in that it may bias the t-statistics downward. Thus, our statistical methodology should 
yield unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates while preventing overstated t-statistics. 
Test Design 
Our research design is chosen to determine which variables best explain the likelihood of 
financial distress. Unlike prior research that relied on a single measure of financial distress, we use 
four different dichotomous measures of dramatic adverse shifts in financial health, all of which 
relate to the ability of a nonprofit organization to carry out its mission. Due to the limited number 
of years in our sample, we are unable to test a more gradual decline in financial health as was used 
in Gilbert, Menon and Schwartz (1990), Trussel (2002), Trussel and Greenlee (2004). 
1. Insolvency risk.  Insolvency exists when total liabilities are greater than total assets.  
An insolvent organization is one that is unable to pay its debts as they become due, which would 
necessarily impact its ability to provide services. To measure insolvency, we develop an indicator 
variable that is one when a firm has negative net assets or zero when net assets are zero or 
positive.  
2. Financial disruption. A potential early warning sign of future insolvency is a sharp 
drop in net assets. We define a financially disrupted nonprofit as one with a 25 percent or greater 
decline in net assets during a 12-month period.8   
3.  Funding disruption.  An organization with a significant loss of funding will, at some 
point, be forced to reduce or eliminate services.  We define an organization that is experiencing a 
funding disruption as one with a 25 percent or greater decline in total revenues during a 12-month 
period. 
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4.   Program disruption.  An organization that reduces the funds it allocates to program 
expenses is necessarily disrupting or reducing its mission-based services.  Greenlee and Trussel 
(2000) defined as financially vulnerable any nonprofit with any decline in program expenses over 
a three-year period.   Due to data limitations, we rely on a shorter window. Accordingly, we define 
a programmatically-disrupted organization as one with a 25 percent or more reduction in 
allocations to program expenses during a 12-month period.  
We estimate discrete hazard models for each of the four financial vulnerability proxies 
using the Altman, Ohlson, and Tuckman and Chang predictor variables. Many prior studies, such 
as Begley, Ming and Watts (1996) examine classification errors to determine the effectiveness of a 
model in predicting an event. Prediction accuracy is assessed by comparing the total Type I and II 
error rates for each alternative specification. An overall statistic of the percentage of correct 
classifications is determined based on the relative frequency of successes and failures. In keeping 
with that literature, we present classification error results. As a default, we use a cutoff probability 
of 0.50 to classify the observations but conducted tests of robustness using other probabilities.9 
Other researchers (e.g., Hillegeist et al. 2004) argue that relative and incremental 
information content tests are preferable to analysis of classification error rates. When the same 
number of variables is employed, one can compare the results of discrete hazard models using the 
Wald χ² statistic and the Pseudo-R². However, the Ohlson model does not contain the same 
number of regressors as the Altman and Tuckman and Chang models. Hence, we use a non-linear 
version of the Vuong (1989) test that determines statistically whether one set of variables has a 
significantly greater likelihood statistic than a second set.10 These tests show whether some of the 
explanatory variables from the less powerful models provide significant incremental information 
beyond that of the most powerful model.11  
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4. Sample Selection  
The annual Internal Revenue Service Form 990 tax filing is the principal disclosure 
mechanism of nonprofit organizations in the United States. The sample data used in our analysis 
originates from these annual filings. The data is repackaged and disseminated to academic 
researchers by the Urban Institute’s National Center on Charitable Statistics (NCCS). Unlike 
earlier research (such as Trussel 2002) which had to rely on the particular data fields the IRS 
chose to encode for its own purposes, this more recent dataset, known as the digitized dataset, 
includes essentially all the variables contained on Form 990 or Form 990EZ.  
While this dataset is the most comprehensive dataset for the nonprofit sector, it is not 
without limitations. Churches are not required to file. Of the remaining nonprofits, only those with 
over $25,000 in annual revenues are required to file Form 990s annually with the IRS. As 
discussed in Keating and Frumkin (2003), Form 990 deviates, in a number of important regards, 
from audited financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP).  For example, Form 990 can be prepared on a cash basis and from unaudited 
data.  Certain expenses like cost of goods sold must be reported as contra-revenues. Revenues 
exclude unrealized investment gains and losses and the value of certain donated services that are 
recognized under GAAP. Thus there are systematic differences between GAAP-based revenues 
and expenses as compared to those reported on Form 990.  In contrast, balance sheet totals are 
more likely to be in agreement (see Froelich and Knoepfle 1996, Gantz 1999, Froelich, Knoepfle 
and Pollak 2000, and Fischer, Gordon and Kraut 2002).  In addition, the returns are often filed late 
and prone to errors. Moore and Williams (1998) estimate that over half of the filings with errors 
failed to include Schedule A, about one-fifth were not signed, and one-tenth indicated the wrong 
tax year.12 
The sample is drawn from the NCCS dataset on 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations filing 
Form 990s in the 1998 to 2000 period. The final sample totals 290,579 nonprofit organizations 
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drawn from the 1999 and 2000 dataset.13 In addition, 8,918 firm year observations were dropped 
because they covered a reporting period that was shorter or longer than 12 months. As we are 
interested in explaining the first instance of financial distress, any particular observation is 
removed if the firm had already experienced this form of distress in the prior year. Hence, the 
number of observations included in a regression varies with the dependent variable of interest. 
5. Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 As Table 1, Panel A, indicates, our sample is composed of 290,579 firm-year 
observations covering 1999 and 2000. During this period, the annual rate of insolvency was 7.1 
percent, just half as high as the likelihood of experiencing a drop of 25 percent or more in net 
assets (14.4 percent). A comparable percentage decline in total revenues was almost as frequent at 
12.7 percent, while a 25 percent drop in program expenses was 9.4 percent. As a comparison, the 
corporate bankruptcy rate for the comparable period was 2.1 percent (Hillegeist et al. 2004). 
Table 1 
Financial vulnerability, however measured, differs considerably across nonprofit 
subsectors. Human service organizations exhibited the highest rate of insolvency at 10.5 percent, 
with health-related groups experiencing the next highest insolvency rate at 7.6 percent. 
Surprisingly, these two groups did not experience the highest rates of financial, funding and 
program disruption risk. In fact, human services posted among the lowest rates for disruption risks 
of any subgroup. Educational and other nonprofit organizations experienced low rates of 
insolvency at 3.5 percent and 3.8 percent, respectively. The “all other category” comprises a 
diverse group of entities including environmental organizations, public policy, and federated 
fundraising. This sub-sector had the highest percentage of firms that experienced funding and 
program disruptions (18.5 percent and 12.7 percent, respectively). 
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Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the full sample. The statistics suggest that the 
sample is somewhat skewed, based on the difference between the mean and the median results. 
The median organization has a relatively concentrated funding mix (RCI), has only modest levels 
of leverage (TL/TA) at seven percent, operates with an annual surplus (NI/TR) that average six 
percent, and spends eight percent of its revenues on administrative costs (AE/TR).  
Table 2  
Surprisingly, the correlation between the four failure variables is relatively low; the risk 
of insolvency is only correlated 0.14, -0.04, and 0.01 with financial, funding and program 
disruption risks, respectively (Table 3). The highest correlation among the dependent variables is 
0.33 between funding and program disruption risks (TRDrop and PEDrop). The correlation 
between the dependent and the independent variables is also remarkably low. The revenue 
concentration index (RCI) is the Tuckman and Chang variable with the highest correlations: 0.09 
with insolvency risk and 0.08 with financial disruption. All other correlations between Tuckman 
and Chang variables and the dependent variables are 0.03 or less. The four Altman predictive 
variables have correlations of -0.17 to 0.05 with the four dependent variables. The Ohlson 
variables exhibit a rather uneven relation with the financial vulnerability measures. INTWO is 
correlated 0.25 with insolvency risk and 0.16 with financial disruption, while SIZE is correlated -
0.22 with financial disruption risk (NADrop). Change in net income (CHIN) is correlated -0.18 
and -0.28 with financial and funding disruptions, respectively. Finally, SIZE and CHIN show the 
strongest relation with program disruption risk at -0.07 and 0.08, respectively. 
Table 3  
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Regression and Test Results 
Insolvency risk. 
The models presented in Table 4, Panel A, attempt to identify organizations that have 
more liabilities than assets and are, therefore, technically insolvent. The effectiveness of the three 
models is dramatically different. The Tuckman and Chang model has virtually no explanatory 
power despite three of the four variables being statistically significant and in the expected 
direction. In contrast, the Altman and Ohlson models have higher explanatory power in terms of 
both pseudo R2 and log likelihoods. This finding is not surprising, given that both models contain 
financial leverage measures (NA/TA and TL/TA) that are not included among the Tuckman and 
Chang variables.14 The superior explanatory power of the Ohlson model is due to the significance 
of the size variable and the two prior profitability variables (INTWO and CHIN). In other words, 
the Ohlson model finds that insolvency is more likely when a firm is small (SIZE), experienced a 
loss in the prior year (INTWO) and a decline in net income from the prior year (CHIN). 
Interestingly, The Altman and Ohlson models are much better at predicting nonprofit insolvency 
with R2 of 0.14 and 0.34, respectively, than they are in estimating corporate bankruptcy.15   
Table 4  
We then conduct tests of the models’ ability to predict insolvency correctly.  In Table 4, 
Panel B, we report the success in classifying the observations using a cutoff probability of 0.50.16   
We find none of the models are effective at predicting failure. In fact, the naïve model that simply 
predicts that no firms will become insolvent performs as well or better than the Tuckman and 
Chang and Altman models.17 The Ohlson model performs modestly better in classifying firms 
(98.37 percent correct to 98.34 percent for the other models). While the prediction classification 
errors are practically indistinguishable for the insolvency risk models, the series of Vuong (1989) 
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tests indicate that the Ohlson model outperforms the Altman and Tuckman and Chang models not 
only individually but also collectively (Table 4, Panel C).  
Financial disruption risk. 
Organizations that are not technically insolvent may suffer a sharp decline in net assets 
that would take them closer to insolvency. The models of financial disruption risk are presented in 
Table 5, Panel A. For the Tuckman and Chang model, three variables (RCI, NI/TR and AE/TR) 
are significant but only two have the expected sign and the model overall yields a Pseudo-R2 of 
just 0.04.18 The Altman model performs more weakly with a Pseudo-R2 of 0.01 even though all 
four variables were at least marginally significant. In contrast to the first two models, the Ohlson 
model yields much greater explanatory power with a Pseudo-R2 of 0.18. All variables except 
WC/TA have the predicted sign and SIZE, NI/TA, INTWO, NAFail, and CHIN are all 
significantly related to a sharp drop in net assets. Notably absent from the significant variables is 
the measure of financial leverage (TL/TA) that was significant in predicting insolvency.  
Table 5  
As the regression statistics indicate, the Ohlson model performs substantially better than 
the other models individually or combined when Vuong tests are conducted (Table 5, Panel C). 
Despite its superior explanatory power, the Ohlson model actually classifies more firms 
incorrectly than the naïve model. As seen in Table 5, Panel B, the naïve model is marginally more 
effective in classifying firm years correctly than the three empirical models. However, this 
assumes that the cost of a classification error is the same for false positive and false negatives. The 
Ohlson model produces a different pattern of errors than the naïve and other prediction models. 
Specifically, it is less likely to falsely classify a firm as healthy when it is financially distressed, 
while it is more likely to falsely classify a financially robust firm as unhealthy. 
Funding disruption risk. 
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These models attempt to predict a 25 percent decline in revenues, our third proxy for 
financial vulnerability.  Results are presented in Table 6. Consistent with findings of Greenlee and 
Trussel (2000), the revenue concentration index is positively related to the risk of severe funding 
drops. Overall, the Tuckman and Chang model has higher explanatory power in predicting a 
funding disruption with a Pseudo-R2 of 0.08 than it had in foreshadowing insolvency (Table 4) or 
a sharp drop in net assets (Table 5) even though only one of the four variables carried the 
predicted sign. The Altman model again has little explanatory power (Pseudo-R2 of 0.02) with just 
one of the four explanatory variables being both significant and in the predicted direction.  
The Ohlson model has the highest explanatory power. The same five variables that were 
significant for predicting financial disruption risk (SIZE, NI/TA, INTWO, NAFail, and CHIN) are 
at least marginally significant for predicting funding disruption, although the coefficients on the 
SIZE, NI/TA and NAFail variables carry the wrong sign. The Ohlson model continues to have 
higher explanatory power than the Tuckman and Chang and Altman models combined as shown in 
Table 6, Panel C. The Tuckman and Chang model exhibits higher explanatory power than the 
Altman model (Table 6, Panel C) and has a slightly better ability to classify firm-years as 
compared to the other models (Table 6, Panel B). 
Table 6 
Program disruption risk. 
The fourth set of models attempts to identify organizations that experience a 25 percent 
decline in program services (Table 7). The explanatory power of all three models is remarkably 
low with Pseudo-R2 of between 0.01 and 0.02. These weak results are consistent with the findings 
of Greenlee and Trussel (2000). The Tuckman and Chang model has two variables that are 
significant and carry the predicted sign as compared to just one for the Altman model. As was the 
case with the financial and funding disruption risk proxies, Tuckman and Chang variables have 
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more explanatory power than the Altman variables (see Panel C in Tables 5, 6 and 7). The 
Tuckman and Chang model also performs marginally better classifying entities as vulnerable 
(Table 7, Panel B). However, the Ohlson variables continue to outperform the other two models 
both individually and combined (Table 7, Panel C).  Size, profitability (INTWO and CHIN) and 
leverage are the only variables from the Ohlson model that are significant in the program 
disruption model with the coefficient on CHIN being positive rather than the expected negative 
sign (Table 7, Panel A).  
Table 7 
6. Toward A New Model of Financial Vulnerability 
The low predictive and explanatory ability of models derived from the for-profit business 
sector may be a result of the highly diverse nonprofit sector and unique characteristics of the 
nonprofit form.  Bowman (2002) argues that characteristics unique to nonprofit organizations 
affect their decision to borrow.  The unique characteristics he lists include the lack of owners, 
existence of donor-restrictions on assets, the ability to sell tax-exempt bonds, and the fact that 
nonprofit entities cannot be forced into involuntary bankruptcy.  He found that endowments are an 
important part of the financial structure of many large nonprofit firms and that it was necessary to 
isolate the confounding effect of their endowments to understand the financing decisions these 
organizations make with respect to operating assets and liabilities.  Since institutions with large 
endowments are concentrated in education (colleges and universities) and health care (hospitals), 
financial vulnerability models that control for industry segment may be picking up more 
fundamental underlying differences in financial structure.  
In this section, we explore whether a new model may have higher explanatory and 
predictive power. We consider two large categories of variables that may be significantly related 
to financial distress – systematic and firm-specific. Systematic risk includes macroeconomic, 
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regional and industry factors that affect revenues (such as donations, investment income, and 
program service revenue) as well as the demand for services. Proxies for this include inflation, 
gross domestic and state product, the level of corporate earnings, stock and bond returns, and 
government funding of certain programs. These and other macroeconomic factors may be 
impounded in the control variables for year used in this study since the markets and other 
economic factors were declining during 2000 as compared to the prosperity of 1998 and 1999. The 
other systematic risk factor that we control uses industry groupings based on the newer North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS).  
The firm-specific risk is essentially a fundamental analysis of a nonprofit firm in the 
spirit of Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Arbarbanell and Bushee (1997). These papers examine 
the relation between specific accounting-based fundamental signals, on one hand, and earnings 
and stock returns, on the other. Our analysis starts with the fundamental signals from the Tuckman 
and Chang, Altman, and Ohlson models.19  
We then supplement the variables from these three models with two others that nonprofit 
literature has found to be important in evaluating financial health. These are reliance on 
commercial revenues (Frumkin and Keating 2003) and endowment sufficiency (Bowman 2002). 
For the reliance on commercial revenues measure, we use commercial revenue as a share of total 
revenue, where commercial revenues are composed of proceeds from sales of goods as well as 
program service fees and charges generally paid by clients, insurance companies or some 
government agencies. Consistent with Frumkin and Keating (2003), we expect that a firm will be 
less likely to experience financial distress if it relies more heavily on commercial rather than 
donative revenues since contributions are often non-recurring and sensitive to changes in 
economic and political conditions. For endowment sufficiency, we use the ratio of investment 
portfolio to total assets. We expect that organizations experience less funding and hence program 
disruption if they can rely more heavily on an endowment and its associated investment income.20 
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Therefore, both the reliance on commercial revenues (COMREV/TR) and endowment sufficiency 
(INV/TA) variables are expected to carry a negative coefficient in the models.  
Table 8 portrays our results. The new variables added explanatory power to all four 
prediction models. Their impact is most clear with respect to the funding and program disruption 
risk proxies for financial vulnerability.  For these two models, the coefficients for COMREV/TR 
and INV/TA were significant and carried the predicted sign. For insolvency risk and financial 
disruption risk (a sharp decline in net assets), the picture was less clear.  The existence of an 
investment portfolio appears to increase the risk of financial disruption as indicated by the 
significant positive coefficient on INV/TA in that model.  The level of commercial revenues 
appears to increase the risk of insolvency as indicated by the significant positive coefficient on 
COMREV/TR in the insolvency risk model. COMREV/TR is not significant in the financial 
disruption risk model and INV/TA was not significant in the insolvency risk model.  
Table 8 
In Panel C of Table 8, we compare the performance of our new models to the best 
performing benchmark model (Ohlson). We find that the expanded models outperform the best 
benchmark model for each of the four financial vulnerability proxies.  For the insolvency and 
financial risk models, the increase in Psuedo-R2 is quite modest. However, in the case of funding 
disruption risk, our new model produces a Psuedo-R2 of 0.19 in contrast to the Pseudo-R2 of 0.13 
for the Ohlson model. In addition, the new model is able to correctly classify 88.62 percent of the 
sample (Table 9, Panel B) in contrast to the 87.45 percent correctly identified by the Ohlson model 
(Table 6, Panel B). In the case of program disruption risk, the new model has twice the 
explanatory power of the benchmark model. The Vuong tests indicate that the overall explanatory 
power of the expanded models is substantially higher than the best single model (Ohlson) for all 
four proxies (Table 8, Panel C). 
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7. Summary, Limitations, and Conclusions 
 This study assesses the effectiveness of three existing financial distress models in 
predicting technical insolvency (liabilities greater than assets) or sharp changes in the financial 
health of nonprofit organizations. Due to the increased availability of a broader range of financial 
variables, we are able to compute some ratios that could, in the past, be examined for only a small 
subset of primarily large tax-exempt organizations. On the other hand, the available data does not 
permit us to examine more than a one-year lag or predict financial vulnerability more than one 
year in advance.  The brevity of the time series also makes it difficult to meaningfully consider 
macroeconomic variables that may contribute to systematic risk or firm-specific multi-year 
patterns, such as small but accumulating declines in revenue. 
We find that the Ohlson (1980) model consistently outperforms another commonly used 
for-profit model reported in Altman (1968) as well as a prediction model based on Tuckman and 
Chang (1991) that has been used in nonprofit research. These results are robust to the choice of 
proxy for financial vulnerability.  
While the existing prediction models provide insights into some indicators of future 
financial vulnerability, they are not very effective in distinguishing the particular firms that will 
experience distress. Therefore, researchers and practitioners are not encouraged to use any of these 
models for purposes of default or bankruptcy prediction. The expanded model that is proposed 
here, however, offers significant improvements in explanatory power, particularly when funding 
disruption is the measure of financial vulnerability.  The addition of the two variables (reliance on 
commercial revenues and endowment sufficiency) improves the relative explanatory power for 
every proxy examined.    
Predicting when nonprofit organizations will need to substantially cut program expenses 
seems to be the most difficult challenge.  All models showed little explanatory power and most of 
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the variables useful for predicting other measurers of financial vulnerability were either not 
significant or had the opposite sign when used to predict program cuts.  This is possibly due to the 
desire on the part of nonprofit managers and boards to protect program services at all costs and 
find ways to fund mission-related activities even in the face of declining revenues or net assets.  
More work in this area would appear to be warranted since board members and donors are most 
interested in whether an organization will be able to continue to provide services. 
With the availability of more complete financial datasets on nonprofit organizations, 
future researchers may be able to use a longer data series to develop a more effective model for 
predicting financial distress. Ideally, such a model would examine overall economic indicators and 
industry-specific factors as well as a more robust set of firm idiosyncratic variables that may be 
leading indicators of financial trouble. The specific variables selected for use in earlier models was 
at least partially determined by the financial data available at the time.  With more complete 
financial data becoming available, there may be other variables unique to nonprofit organizations 
that would improve models originally designed for the for-profit sector. One potential way to 
identify such variables would be to examine the accounting, financial and economic factors that 
are considered when auditors issue going concern opinions or when rating agencies lower a 
nonprofit’s bond rating.  
Currently, nonprofit governing boards may be uncertain about the financial health of their 
organizations despite having access to reams of detailed financial data. Since there is no single 
bottom line (“profits”) to guide decisions, proper governance of a nonprofit organization can be 
complex. The fruits of financial vulnerability research could be very helpful. Coefficients from a 
validated prediction model would enable regulators, foundations, auditors, audit committees and 
others to determine whether a nonprofit organization was at risk of financial distress. Regulatory 
agencies might use the aggregate information in setting public policy. Foundations could evaluate 
both potential and current grantees. A score from the model might help auditors assess risk and 
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therefore the extent of necessary audit procedures. For trustees, a “not at risk” score might 
alleviate concerns while an “at risk” score could help identify potential areas of risk and guide 
responsible governance. 
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Endnotes 
1. Two provisions of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act apply to all corporate entities, regardless 
of tax status (BoardSource and Independent Sector 2003). 
2.  They also find that an option-pricing model based on Black and Scholes (1973) and 
Merton (1973) has higher predictive power than the original or updated Altman and 
Ohlson models. We are unable to use this approach as the model relies on market values 
and volatilities, information that is not available for nonprofit organizations.  
3.  Further, under the U.S. federal bankruptcy code, a nonprofit cannot be forced into 
involuntary liquidation or reorganization (11 U.S.C.A. § 303 (a)).  Most states, however, 
permit nonprofits to dissolve either voluntarily or by judicial order for a variety of 
reasons, including abandonment of the activity of the organization.  Hager et al (1996) 
found that Minnesotan nonprofits dissolved voluntarily because they were either unable 
or unwilling to carry out the activities of the organization. 
4. Altman’s RE/TA is replaced by NA/TA (net assets divided by total assets).  The book 
value of equity = NA and TA minus NA equals total liabilities (TL).  Thus NA/TA and 
NA/TL would be highly (but not perfectly) correlated. 
5. Ohlson called this second solvency variable OENEG, indicating that the variable equals 
one when owners’ equity is negative. Since this variable is identical to our NAFail risk of 
insolvency variable, we have renamed it. This independent variable is dropped when risk 
of insolvency is the proxy for financial vulnerability.  
6. For for-profit entities, EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, (income) taxes, 
depreciation and amortization. Income taxes are not relevant for tax-exempt entities and 
amortization on Form 990 is combined with depreciation expense. Depreciation and 
amortization are excluded since they do not represent cash outflows.   
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7. Shumway used the natural log of firm trading age; Hillegeist et al. used the used the 
bankruptcy rate in the past 12 months. We are unable to use these alternatives since we 
do not have sufficient data. 
8. Trussel and Greenlee (2004) used both 20 percent and 50 percent declines in net assets as 
proxies for this variable and Greenlee and Trussel (2000) used any decline in program 
expenses as a proxy for program disruption. For simplicity, we use a 25 percent decline 
for all three financial disruption proxies. 
9. This analysis will be found in the Panel B section of Tables 4 through 8. 
10. We thank Donald Cram for providing us with the SAS code to conduct a Vuong test 
using results from two logistic regressions.  
11.   This analysis will be found in the Panel C section of Tables 4 through 8. 
12. The first two problems do not impact this study but the results might be affected through 
the   control variables used for tax year. The dummy variables for year are also imprecise 
since the Form 990 filing year is denoted as the year during which the fiscal period 
begins.  For example, returns dated 1999 may actually cover a substantial portion of 2000 
and only a few months from 1999. 
13. The 1998 dataset is used only to develop lagged variables to estimate the 1999 prediction 
model. 
14. Since NA/TA = (1 – TL/TA), these two leverage variables are measuring the same 
phenomenon as shown by the 1.00 correlation in Table 2. 
15. Hillegeist et al. (2004) report R2 of 0.07 and 0.11 for the Altman and Ohlson models for 
the 1979-1997 sample period. 
16. We conducted robustness checks using cutoff values ranging from 0.1 to 0.9.  The high 
rate of misclassification persists under these different assumptions with the results for 
cutoffs of 0.25 and 0.75 being nearly identical to those using a cutoff value of 0.5. 
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17. Trussel (2002) also conducted extensive sensitivity tests using different cutoff 
probabilities and prior probabilities.  He also reports that both the naïve model and a 
modified Tuckman and Chang model have similarly high misclassification rates under 
most assumptions. 
18. The χ2 statistic and p-values are 2,616.40 and 0.00, respectively, which is comparable to 
the explanatory power of Trussel (2002). Trussel does not report Pseudo-R2. 
19. Only one version of the leverage variables (Altman’s NA/TA) is included in each model 
since Ohlson’s TL/TA = (1 – NA/TA).   
20. Endowments, strictly speaking, would equal permanently restricted net assets.  However, 
many organizations have quasi-endowments that are not donor restricted. We use the 
investment portfolio as a proxy for the total of funds functioning as an endowment.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Description 
Panel A: Year-By-Year Patterns in Financial Vulnerability
Year Number of Firms
Number of 
NAFail % Firms 
Number of 
NADrop % Firms 
Number of 
TRDrop % Firms 
Number of 
PEDrop % Firms 
1999 137,080 9,711 7.08% 20,299 14.81% 17,368 12.67% 12,893 9.41%
2000 153,499 10,871 7.08% 21,667 14.12% 19,456 12.68% 14,355 9.35%
Total 290,579 20,582 7.08% 41,966 14.44% 36,824 12.67% 27,248 9.38%
Panel B: Industry Patterns in Financial Vulnerabilty 
Industry Number of Firms
Number of 
NAFail % Firms 
Number of 
NADrop % Firms 
Number of 
TRDrop % Firms 
Number of 
PEDrop % Firms 
Arts 28,320 1,670 5.90% 4,576 16.16% 4,337 15.31% 3,082 10.88%
Education 44,912 1,591 3.54% 6,391 14.23% 5,900 13.14% 4,137 9.21%
Health 47,870 3,613 7.55% 6,666 13.93% 5,424 11.33% 4,662 9.74%
Human Services 105,730 11,086 10.49% 14,796 13.99% 9,905 9.37% 7,498 7.09%
Religious 13,972 719 5.15% 2,500 17.89% 2,066 14.79% 1,527 10.93%
Other 49,775 1,903 3.82% 7,037 14.14% 9,192 18.47% 6,342 12.74%
Total 290,579 20,582 7.08% 41,966 14.44% 36,824 12.67% 27,248 9.38%
NAFail, i.e. insolvency risk, represents an excess of liabilities over assets (negative net assets)
NADrop, i.e. financial disruption risk, represents a drop of 25% or more in net assets in twelve months
TRDrop, i.e. funding disruption risk, represents a drop of 25% or more in total revenues in twelve months
PEDrop, i.e. program disruption risk, represents a drop of 25% or more in program expenses in twelve month
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Based on 290,579 firm-years
Variable Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum
NAFail 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00
NADrop 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00
TRDrop 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00
PEDrop 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00
NA/TR 1.99 30.06 0.61 -1.19 18.15
RCI 0.79 0.19 0.85 0.38 1.00
NI/TR 0.09 2.61 0.06 -1.00 0.95
AE/TR 0.13 0.93 0.08 0.00 0.88
WC/TA 0.39 3.02 0.41 -1.05 1.00
NA/TA 0.60 4.61 0.93 -1.97 1.00
EBIT/TA 0.00 3.50 0.05 -2.52 1.00
TR/TA 4.18 47.24 1.11 0.05 43.79
Size 8.10 2.27 8.05 3.07 13.96
TL/TA 0.40 4.61 0.07 0.00 2.97
CL/CA 1.64 223.63 0.03 0.00 8.98
NI/TA 0.01 3.49 0.05 -2.47 1.00
FFO/TL 36.32 5,158.62 -28.41 -190.00 0.01
INTWO 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00
CHIN -0.02 0.71 -0.01 -1.00 1.00
 
NAFail, insolvency risk, coded 1 if liabilities are greater than assets, 0 otherwise. 
NADrop, financial disruption risk, coded 1 if drop in net assets ≥ 25% in 12 months, 0 otherwise 
TRDrop, funding disruption risk, coded 1 if drop in total revenues ≥ 25% in 12 months, 0 otherwise 
PEDrop, program disruption risk, coded 1 if drop program expenses ≥ 25% in 12 months, 0 otherwise 
NA/TR is net assets divided by total revenues 
RCI is the revenue concentration index defined as     
NI/TR is net income divided by total revenues 
AE/TR is administrative expenses divided by total revenues 
WC/TA is working capital divided by total assets. 
NA/TA is net assets divided by total assets. 
EBIT/TA is earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. 
TR/TA is total revenue divided by total assets 
SIZE is the ln(Total Assets/GDP price level index). 
TL/TA is total liabilities divided by total assets. 
CL/CA is current liabilities divided by current assets. 
NI/TA is net income divided by total assets. 
FFO/TL is pre-tax income plus depreciation and amortization divided by total liabilities. 
INTWO is one if Net Income was negative for the last year, zero otherwise. 
CHIN is (NIt-NIt-1)/(|NIt|+|NIt-1|) is the scaled change in net income. 
2
Revenue Total
Revenue∑ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ i
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TABLE 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Based on 290,658 firm-years
Correlations greater than .20 in absolute magnitude are in bold
Variable NAFail NADrop TRDrop PEDrop NA/TR RCI NI/TR AE/TR WC/TA NA/TA EBIT/TA TR/TA Size TL/TA CL/CA NI/TA FFO/TL INTWO
Proxies for financial vulnerability:
NAFail 1.00
NADrop 0.14 1.00
TRDrop -0.04 0.11 1.00
PEDrop 0.01 0.06 0.33 1.00
Tuckman & Chang variables:
NA/TR -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.01 1.00
RCI 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.01 1.00
NI/TR -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.63 -0.01 1.00
AE/TR 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.14 -0.01 -0.52 1.00
Altman variables:
WC/TA -0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
NA/TA -0.17 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.68 1.00
EBIT/TA -0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.15 1.00
TR/TA 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.14 -0.06 1.00
Ohlson (additional) variables:
SIZE -0.02 -0.22 0.01 -0.07 0.04 -0.14 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.05 -0.14 1.00
TL/TA 0.17 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.68 -1.00 -0.15 0.14 -0.05 1.00
CL/CA 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.00
NI/TA -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.15 0.14 1.00 -0.06 0.05 -0.14 0.00 1.00
FFO/TL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
INTWO 0.25 0.16 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 1.00
CHIN 0.01 -0.18 -0.28 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.07 0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 0.01
All correlations that are 0.01 or greater are significant at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 4 
Risk of Insolvency 
Panel A: Discrete Hazard Regressions Panel B: Classification Errors
Predicted 
Sign
Tuckman 
& Chang 
Model
Altman 
Model
Ohlson 
Model#
Tuckman 
& Chang Altman Ohlson Naïve
Constant -4.98 -2.11*** -3.26*** % of False Failures 0.01% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00%
NA/TR - -0.26* % of False Successes 100.00% 99.96% 92.99% 100.00%
RCI +  1.30*** % Correct Classification 98.33% 98.34% 98.37% 98.34%
NI/TR - -0.16***
AE/TR -  0.18 Panel B uses 0.5 as the cut-off probability to classify the errors
WC/TA -  0.29* 0.06
NA/TA - -3.33***
EBIT/TA - -0.01 Panel C: Relative Explanatory Power using Vuong (1989)
TR/TA -  0.00
SIZE - -0.45*** Comparison z-statistic
TL/TA +  4.00*** -5.1***
CL/CA +  0.00 -15.3***
NI/TA - -0.01 Altman vs.Ohlson -33.4***
FFO/TL -  0.0 -28.9***
INTWO +  2.02***
CHIN - -1.70*** z-statistics resulting from Vuong Test (1989). Positive/(negative)
Log Likelihood -21,688 -19,588 -15,120  values  indicate that the first/(second) group of variables 
Pseudo-R2 0.05 0.14 0.34 explains significantly more of the variance
Insolvency risk represents negative net assets (liabilities in excess of assets)
Regression using the discrete hazard model with 270,346 firm-year observations #  NAFail is omitted from the Ohlson model since it is the dependent variable
and Huber-White standard errors to control for firm dependence.
All regressions include industry and year as controls (coefficients not shown) *** (**) [*] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test)
Tuckman & Chang vs. Altman
Tuckman & Chang vs. Ohlson
Tuckman & Chang and Altman vs. Ohlson
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TABLE 5 
Financial Disruption Risk 
Panel A: Discrete Hazard Regressions Panel B: Classification Errors
Predicted 
Sign
Tuckman 
& Chang 
Model
Altman 
Model
Ohlson 
Model
Tuckman 
& Chang Altman Ohlson Naïve
Constant -2.29*** -1.75***  0.77*** % of False Failures 0.09% 0.11% 1.47% 0.00%
NA/TR - -0.13 % of False Successes 99.82% 99.56% 91.05% 100.00%
RCI + -1.08*** % Correct Classification 86.53% 86.55% 86.51% 86.58%
NI/TR - -0.46***
AE/TR - -0.41*** Panel B uses 0.5 as the cut-off probability to classify the errors
WC/TA -  0.15*  0.02**
NA/TA - -0.15*
EBIT/TA - -0.00* Panel C: Relative Explanatory Power using Vuong (1989)
TR/TA -  0.00***
SIZE - -0.39*** Comparison z-statistic
TL/TA +  0.00 13.7***
CL/CA +  0.00 -62.6***
NI/TA - -0.01** Altman vs.Ohlson -88.1***
FFO/TL -  0.00 -62.5***
INTWO +  0.98***
NAFail +  1.20*** z-statistics resulting from Vuong Test (1989). Positive/(negative)
CHIN - -1.13***  values  indicate that the first/(second) group of variables 
Log Likelihood -104,652 -107,464 -89,784 explains significantly more of the variance
Pseudo-R2 0.04 0.01 0.18
Financial disruption risk represents a 25% or more decline in net assets
Regression using the discrete hazard model with 276,052 firm-year observations All regressions include industry and year as controls (coefficients not shown)
and Huber-White standard errors to control for firm dependence. *** (**) [*] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test)
Tuckman & Chang vs. Ohlson
Tuckman & Chang and Altman vs. Ohlson
Tuckman & Chang vs. Altman
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TABLE 6 
Funding Disruption Risk 
Panel A: Discrete Hazard Regressions Panel B: Classification Errors
Predicted 
Sign
Tuckman 
& Chang 
Model
Altman 
Model
Ohlson 
Model
Tuckman 
& Chang Altman Ohlson Naïve
Constant -2.23*** -1.50*** -1.99*** % of False Failures 0.21% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00%
NA/TR -  0.00 % of False Successes 98.26% 99.90% 99.97% 100.00%
RCI +  0.20*** % Correct Classification 87.49% 87.45% 87.45% 87.45%
NI/TR -  2.22***
AE/TR -  0.43 Panel B uses 0.5 as the cut-off probability to classify the errors
WC/TA - -0.08*** -0.02*
NA/TA -  0.07***
EBIT/TA -  0.13*** Panel C: Relative Explanatory Power using Vuong (1989)
TR/TA -  0.00
SIZE -  0.02*** Comparison z-statistic
TL/TA + -0.00* 10.5***
CL/CA +  0.00 -9.6***
NI/TA -  0.01* Altman vs.Ohlson -70.6***
FFO/TL -  0.00 -9.6***
INTWO +  0.06***
NAFail + -0.24*** z-statistics resulting from Vuong Test (1989). Positive/(negative)
CHIN - -1.42***  values  indicate that the first/(second) group of variables 
Log Likelihood -96,040 -102,863 -91,315 explains significantly more of the variance
Pseudo-R2 0.08 0.02 0.13
Funding disruption risk represents a 25% or more decline in total revenues
Regression using the discrete hazard model with 280,698 firm-year observations All regressions include industry and year as controls (coefficients not shown)
and Huber-White standard errors to control for firm dependence. *** (**) [*] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test)
Tuckman & Chang vs. Altman
Tuckman & Chang vs. Ohlson
Tuckman & Chang and Altman vs. Ohlson
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TABLE 7 
Program Disruption Risk 
Panel A: Discrete Hazard Regressions Panel B: Classification Errors
Predicted 
Sign
Tuckman 
& Chang 
Model
Altman 
Model
Ohlson 
Model
Tuckman 
& Chang Altman Ohlson Naïve
Constant -1.83*** -1.92*** -1.21*** % of False Failures 0.04% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
NA/TR -  0.00 % of False Successes 99.44% 99.95% 99.99% 100.00%
RCI +  0.03 % Correct Classification 90.85% 90.83% 90.83% 90.83%
NI/TR - -0.46***
AE/TR - -0.46*** Panel B uses 0.5 as the cut-off probability to classify the errors
WC/TA -  0.01*  0.00
NA/TA - -0.01
EBIT/TA - -0.02** Panel C: Relative Explanatory Power using Vuong (1989)
TR/TA -  0.00
SIZE - -0.09*** Comparison z-statistic
TL/TA +  0.00* 9.9***
CL/CA +  0.00 -6.6***
NI/TA - -0.01 Altman vs.Ohlson -23.6***
FFO/TL -  0.00 -6.2***
INTWO +  0.20***
NAFail + -0.03 z-statistics resulting from Vuong Test (1989). Positive/(negative)
CHIN -  0.35***  values  indicate that the first/(second) group of variables 
Log Likelihood -84,439 -85,196 -83,864 explains significantly more of the variance
Pseudo-R2 0.02 0.01 0.02
Program disruption risk represents a 25% or more decline in program expenses
Regression using the discrete hazard model with 290,579 firm-year observations All regressions include industry and year as controls (coefficients not shown)
and Huber-White standard errors to control for firm dependence. *** (**) [*] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test)
Tuckman & Chang vs. Altman
Tuckman & Chang vs. Ohlson
Tuckman & Chang and Altman vs. Ohlson
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TABLE 8 
Expanded Models 
Panel A: Discrete Hazard Regressions
Predicted 
Sign Insolvency Risk
Financial             
Disruption Risk
Funding            
Disruption Risk
Program           
Disruption Risk
Constant  0.2 -0.42*** -2.09*** -0.88***
NA/TR - -0.03*** -0.04***  0.00***  0.00
RCI +  0.50***  0.77*** -0.14*** -0.24***
NI/TR - -0.09*** -0.32***  1.69*** -0.32***
AE/TR - -0.05** -0.12  0.48 -0.31***
WC/TA -  0.05  0.00 -0.01**  0.00*
NA/TA - -3.98***  0.01*  0.00 -0.00*
EBIT/TA - -0.16** -0.05 -0.05 -0.04*
TR/TA -  0.00***  0.00  0.00*  0.00
SIZE - -0.45*** -0.33*** -0.00 -0.09***
CL/CA +  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
NI/TA +  0.15**  0.04  0.05  0.04*
FFO/TL -  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00***
INTWO -  2.06***  0.98***  0.73***  0.15***
NAFail +  1.20***  0.19***  0.10***
CHIN - -1.81*** -1.31*** -1.42***  0.32***
COMREV/TR -  0.34*** -0.03 -1.08*** -0.65***
INV/TA -  0.00  0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
Number of Observations 265,374 271,046 271,888 275,621
Log Likelihood -14,282 -80,451 -85,260 -80,911
Pseudo-R2 0.36 0.19 0.19 0.04
Based on discrete hazard model with Huber-White standard errors to control for firm dependence. Industry and year included as controls (coeffcients not sh
COMREV/TR is commercial revenues divided by total revenues INV/TA is investment portfolio divided by total assets
Panel B: Classification Errors for the Exanded Models
Insolvency Risk
Financial             
Disruption Risk
Funding            
Disruption Risk
Program           
Disruption Risk
% of False Failures 0.01% 1.32% 0.40% 0.03%
% of False Successes 98.58% 93.19% 88.35% 99.53%
% Correct Classification 98.37% 87.70% 88.62% 90.90%
Panel B uses  0.5 as the cut-off probability to classify the errors
Panel C: Relative Explanatory Power using Vuong (1989)
z-statistic
4.7***
11.3***
7.5***
6.3***
z-statistics resulting from Vuong Test (1989). Positive/(negative) values indicate that the first/(second) group of variables
explains significantly more of the variance
*** (**) [*] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test)
Program Disruption Risk
Funding Disruption Risk
Comparison of New Models to Best Performing Benchmark Models (Ohlson)
Insolvency Risk
Financial Disruption Risk
 
 
